Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy
Volume 4
Issue 2 New Perspectives on Guardianship and
Mental Illness

Article 5

2011

Skeletons in the Family Medical Closet: Access of Personal
Representatives to Interoperable Medical Records
Leslie P. Francis
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, leslie.francis@law.utah.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Leslie P. Francis, Skeletons in the Family Medical Closet: Access of Personal Representatives to
Interoperable Medical Records, 4 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol'y (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp/vol4/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons.
For more information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SKELETONS IN THE FAMILY MEDICAL CLOSET: ACCESS OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO INTEROPERABLE MEDICAL
RECORDS
LESLIE P. FRANCIS*
Achieving the interoperability of electronic health records (EHRs) is a
matter of urgent public policy discussion.1 Protection for the security,
privacy, and confidentiality of the information in EHRs is critical to public
trust in this enterprise.2 Included among privacy concerns is the right of
individuals to request copies of their medical records.3 Less noticed are the
implications of interoperability for access to individuals’ medical records by
their personal representatives. Access by individuals or their personal
representatives is not a trivial matter, as Americans age and Medicare
recipients are encouraged to download information in their EHRs at the
push of a “Blue Button.”4
Historically, paper medical records were siloed at the locations of
providers or organizations creating them.5 State law governed patients’
access to medical records, and many states placed significant limits on
patients’ rights to access their own records.6 All this has changed. The right
of patients to access medical records is now enshrined in federal law.

* J.D., University of Utah; Ph.D., philosophy, University of Michigan; Distinguished Professor
of Law and Philosophy and Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf.
2. See NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, TOWARD ENHANCED INFORMATION
CAPACITIES FOR HEALTH (2010), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/100526concept.pdf.
3. The HIPAA Privacy Rule includes this right of access, 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2010).
4. For a description of the “Blue Button” initiative, see Download My Data/Blue Button,
MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/manage-your-health/personal-health-re
cords/blue-button-download.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (last visited June 10,
2011).
5. See, e.g., Leslie P. Francis, The Physician-Patient Relationship and a National Health
Information Network, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 36, 36-49 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Ellen Klugman, Comment, Toward a Uniform Right to Medical Records: A
Proposal for a Model Patient Access and Information Practices Statute, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1349,
1365-68 (1983).
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Extensive incentives and legal requirements are pushing providers towards
electronic records with increasingly sophisticated interoperability functions.7
Before interoperable EHRs, a personal representative accessing the
medical record of an individual would likely see only paper records
maintained by the team currently involved in the individual’s care. Other
records about that individual would remain in the offices in which they
originally were created. For patient care, siloed office records have wellknown disadvantages.8 For privacy, however, the picture is quite different.
Imagine Mother, age 64, is hospitalized for a stroke and Daughter is her
health care decision-maker. Fully interoperable EHRs could include much
that is not medically relevant to Mother’s current care but that Mother would
not want or expect Daughter to see. Records might feature not only
Mother’s recent medical history, but also her records from her gynecologist,
including the pregnancy she ended at age 45. Or, they could include the
records of Mother’s visits to her internist for treatment for depression after
Dad’s death a few years back—treatment that Mother had proudly and
carefully hidden from the rest of the family. As interoperability becomes
more robust, metaphorical skeletons in the medical history closet will be
increasingly on view to personal representatives making health care
decisions for others. This confidentiality problem warrants ethical and legal
attention that it has not yet received.
The situation of personal representatives, moreover, may be ethically
complex. Although personal representatives are charged to act either as the
individual would have wanted or in the individual’s best interests, personal
representatives may have important health interests of their own in accessing
health records. Daughter may have health interests in understanding the
circumstances of her conception, circumstances Mother may have wished to
keep private.9 Information about heritable conditions may be critical to
other family members’ decisions about their own health care, but family

7. These incentives are a major part of the federal “stimulus package” investment in
infrastructure. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§
13001-424, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (“HITECH Act”) (2009) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). See also The Official Web Site for the Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health
Records (EHR) Incentive Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/ehrincentiveprograms/ (last modified May 17,
2011).
8. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality
of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 691-707 (2007).
9. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine recommends, but does not require,
parents to inform their offspring of their conception by methods of assisted reproduction.
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Ethics Committee Report: Informing Offspring of
their Conception by Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527, 527-31 (2004).
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members are not always willing to share this information.10 Interests of
personal representatives may be less ethically compelling as well: for
example, interests in assessing how much Mother’s health care will cost,
guessing how soon Mother is likely to die, or learning more family gossip.11
On the other side, Daughter may not want to know some of this
information, either; some people do not want to know the circumstances of
their conception or whether they are at risk for certain heritable conditions.
Additional difficulties are introduced by variations in reasons for and
selection of personal representatives for health care decision-making.
“Personal representative,” as used in this article, covers the range of
individuals who make decisions for others who lack the legal capacity to
make their own health care decisions. Personal representatives in this sense
include parents making health care decisions for their minor children, courtappointed guardians or conservators making decisions for wards,
individuals appointed as holders of durable powers of attorney for health
care, and individuals recognized as decision-makers under state surrogate
decision making statutes. In some cases, these personal representatives will
have been selected by the individuals themselves. In other cases, there will
be information available about the individuals’ prior statements about
preferences, expectations, or choices. The reasons for incapacity will vary
too, including minority, cognitive disability (life-long or adult onset), or
mental illness.
This article begins by describing current federal law about the rights of
patients to access their own medical records. The description pays
particular attention to restrictions on this right, including psychotherapy
notes and endangerment. Federal law gives personal representatives the
same rights as patients to access records as permitted by state law. The
article then analyzes state law rights of access by personal representatives.
In general, states treat access by personal representatives in all or nothing
fashion; if there is a right of access, it is the right to access the entire record.
A few states, however, have considered the problem in more nuanced ways.
Several states allow patients to use advance directives to structure access to
records. Several other states restrict the rights of the personal representative
to access mental health or substance abuse treatment records. Some states

10. There has been considerable discussion in bioethics about the obligations of family
members to share information about heritable conditions. See, e.g., David J. Doukas &
Jessica W. Berg, The Family Covenant and Genetic Testing, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 2-10
(2001) (AJOB Target Article accompanied by many commentaries in the pages following the
article (pp. 11-34)).
11. For a sympathetic discussion of the interests of other family members in the costs or
burdens of their relatives’ care, see John Hardwig, Is There a Duty to Die?, HASTINGS CTR.
RPT., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 34.
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differentiate rights of access of the personal representative depending on
whether the patient is a person with mental illness or cognitive disability.
The examples are quite limited, however. An additional problem is whether
access rights of the personal representative should differ depending on
whether the individual represented is a person with mental illness or with
cognitive disabilities.
This article provides four recommendations:
o Advance directive statutes should permit competent patients to
designate the extent to which their personal representatives
should have access to interoperable medical records.
o Absent a directive, the presumption should be that the personal
representative has access only to records that are needed for
decision making about the patient’s care.
o Interoperable medical records should be designed to allow
special management of sensitive types of medical information
(such as mental health information or treatment for substance
abuse). When patients have identified types of information as
sensitive, personal representatives should not have access to that
information except as necessary for emergency care.
o These principles should apply whether the patient is a person
with mental illness or a person with cognitive disability. For
persons with cognitive disabilities, however, prior preferences
may be more difficult to ascertain.
I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO ACCESS ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS: THE ROLE OF
FEDERAL LAW
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is the
federal statute governing the privacy and security of certain health
information.12 Under HIPAA,13 the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) issued the HIPAA Privacy Rule.14 In 2009, Congress passed
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH Act).15 Along with extensive incentives for use of health
information technology, the HITECH Act also enhances protections for

12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
13. Id. § 264.
14. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2010).
15. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§
13001-424, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (“HITECH Act”) (2009) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
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health information security and privacy.16 HIPAA preempts conflicting state
law, but not consistent state laws that protect privacy more stringently.17 For
several purposes important to this article and discussed below, particularly
the rights of personal representatives, HIPAA largely defers to state law.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule incorporates many (but not all) of Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) which are widely accepted as
guidelines for the protection of identifying information about individuals.18
Core to FIPPs are the rights of individuals to know what information about
them is being collected and how it is being used. Individuals must also be
able to correct mistakes in personally identifiable information about them
held by others.
Following these FIPPs principles, the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides to the
individual a right of access to “protected health information.”19 An
individual’s request for disclosure of medical records is a required disclosure
under HIPAA.20 This right is limited, however, to what is called a
“designated record set.” Information in the designated record set includes
medical records, billing records; “enrollment, payment, claims adjudication,
and case or medical management record systems maintained by or for a
health plan;” or other information used, in whole or in part, to make
decisions about individuals.21 Of interest to individuals, the designated
record set as thus defined does not include data collected for research, data
collected for peer review, or data collected for quality improvement.
16. Id. §§ 13400-24.
17. HIPAA § 264(c).
18. FIPPs were introduced in 1973 by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare in a proposal for practices to govern automated personal data systems. See
RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/
DATACNCL/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm. In 1980, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted the “Guidelines Governing the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,” which include core FIPPs. See Guidelines
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON.
COOP. & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1
_1_1,00.html. The European Union’s data protection directive, Directive 95/46/EC, likewise
rests on FIPPs. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24
October 1995, OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMMUNITY, no. L. 281, 1995, at 31, 31-39, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf. For a
general history of FIPPs, see ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY
(2011), available at http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf.
19. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2010). “Protected health information” is a HIPAA term of art.
For purposes of this article, it can be defined as information that is about health, individually
identifiable, and created or possessed by a health care provider, health care plan, or health
care clearinghouse.
20. Id. § 164.502(a)(2)(i).
21. Id. § 164.501.
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The HITECH Act enhanced patients’ ease of access to health
information in electronic form. If requests are “clear, conspicuous, and
specific,” individuals may request copies of information in EHRs in electronic
form sent to designated entities.22 This provision allows patients to request
copies of their information to be sent directly to personal health records, for
example. It does not, however, expand the information to which individuals
have access beyond the designated record set.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule imposes important limits on patients’ rights of
access. The HITECH Act does not change these limits. These important
limits on the right of access include psychotherapy notes and disclosures that
might cause danger to individuals themselves or to others.
“Psychotherapy notes” are given special protection under the Privacy
Rule, both from disclosures to the patient and to third parties. Disclosure of
psychotherapy notes to third parties requires specific authorization on the
part of the patient, with exceptions enumerated in the Privacy Rule.23
Psychotherapy notes, however, are a quite limited set of mental health
information. Psychotherapy notes include contents of conversations during
therapy sessions, provided these are separated from the rest of the
individual’s medical record. They exclude information about prescription
medication and monitoring, types and frequency of treatment, clinical test
results, and summary accounts of the patient’s status (including “diagnosis,
functional status, the treatment plan, symptoms, prognosis, and progress to
date”).24 Although it includes “clinical tests,” the present definition does not
include results of testing that is part of a mental health evaluation.25 Thus,
much mental health information that patients might want to protect is not

22. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§
13001-424, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (“HITECH Act”) (2009) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
23. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2) (2010). There are exceptions to this: use of the notes by
their originator for treatment, use for training purposes, and use by the treating entity for
defense in a legal action. Id. § 164.508(a)(2)(i). Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996),
recognizes a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. Jaffee influenced the decision to give
special protection to psychotherapy notes in HIPAA, rather than extending special protections
to many types of sensitive information. Psychotherapy Notes, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,652 (Dec. 28,
2000). For an excellent discussion of the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s treatment of psychotherapy
notes, see Daniel B. Lord, The Pitfalls of HIPAA: The Sticky Wicket of Psychotherapy Notes, 29
ALASKA BAR RAG, July-Sept. 2005, at 34-35.
24. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2010).
25. See, e.g., APAPO Builds on Work to Protect Psychological Testing Data, AM. PSYCH.
ASS’N PRACTICE ORG. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.apapracticecentral.org/update/2010/1027/testing-data.aspx. For an overview of the importance of protecting privacy in mental
health treatment with particular attention to the inadequacies of HIPAA, see Paul S.
Appelbaum, Privacy in Psychiatric Treatment: Threats and Responses, 159 AM. J. PSYCH.
1809, 1809-18 (2002).
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included within the special HIPAA protection for psychotherapy notes. The
HITECH Act requires a study of this definition of psychotherapy notes with
respect to test results that are part of a mental health evaluation.26 The
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) is
currently conducting this study in cooperation with the Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) within HHS.27
The Privacy Rule lists exceptions to the requirement of specific patient
authorization for the use or disclosure of psychotherapy notes. These
exceptions include use by the originator of the notes for treatment purposes
and use or disclosure by the covered entity for its own training purposes.28
Other exceptions include disclosures to HHS for review of compliance with
HIPAA29 or for oversight of the health care provider originating the notes.30
These uses, while not uncontroversial, could be justified in terms of the
interests of patients in receiving good care.31 However, other disclosures of
psychotherapy notes permitted without patient authorization are not at all in
the interests of patients. It is perhaps predictable that permitted disclosures
would include defense of the covered entity against a suit brought by the
individual.32 Disclosures of psychotherapy notes permitted without
authorization include disclosures required by law if the conditions applicable
to the legal purpose are met,33 disclosures of information about decedents
to coroners and medical examiners,34 and disclosures needed to avoid a
26. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
13424(f), 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (“HITECH Act”) (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
17954).
27. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES RELATED TO PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING DATA (2010)
[hereinafter PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/ebrochure-la.pdf.
28. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2)(i)(A)–(B) (2010). “Covered entity” is a HIPAA-defined term
meaning health care provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse. Id. §160.103.
Under this provision, the entity within which the patient was treated may use the notes for
training purposes, but the notes may not be disclosed outside the institution for similar
purposes.
29. Id. § 164.502(a)(2)(ii).
30. Id. § 164.512(d).
31. For a discussion of the controversies involved in the use of patients’ records without
authorization in quality assurance, see HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT: ETHICAL AND
REGULATORY ISSUES (Bruce Jennings et al. eds., 2007).
32. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2)(i)(C) (2010).
33. Id. § 164.512(a).
34. Id. § 164.512(g) (2010). These disclosures must be for the purpose of identifying a
decedent, determining cause of death, or fulfilling other legal duties. Id. § 164.512(g). In
promulgating the Privacy Rule, HHS explained this exception as follows:
In general, we have severely limited disclosures of psychotherapy notes without the
individual’s authorization. One case where the information may prove invaluable, but
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serious and imminent threat to health or safety.35 The category of
disclosures permitted without authorization because they are required by law
includes reports of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence.36 The category
also includes disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings,
including disclosures in response to judicial orders, subpoenas, or other
legal processes.37
The special protection HIPAA gives psychotherapy notes extends to
protecting the information from patients themselves. That is, HIPAA
excludes psychotherapy notes from patients’ own rights of access.38 The
study of whether to include test results within the definition asks specifically
whether patients “need to know, or have an interest in, inspecting or
obtaining a copy of such information?”39 In comparison to protecting
mental health treatment information from access by third parties, surprisingly
little has been written about shielding such records from access by patients
themselves. Perhaps the justification is paternalistic: patients would find
such records disturbing. It seems likely that this is a core question in the
study of patient access to results of mental health testing. Perhaps the
concern is that access to such records would undermine the efficacy of the
therapeutic relationship. Another justification—although not centered in the
interests of patients—would be the practical interests of treating

authorization by the individual is impossible and authorization by a surrogate is
potentially contraindicated, is in the investigation of the death of the individual. The
final rule allows for disclosures to coroners or medical examiners in this limited case.
65 Fed. Reg. 82,650, 82,654 (Dec. 28, 2000). Presumably, the concern about authorization
from surrogates here is that the surrogate may be implicated in the death.
35. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i) (2010). For these disclosures, the covered entity must in
good faith believe that the use or disclosure is needed to avert “a serious and imminent threat
to the health or safety of a person or the public” and that the disclosure is to a person
reasonably able to avert the threat (including the target). Id. § 164.512(j)(1)(i). This is
essentially the “Tarasoff” exception to the authorization requirement. See Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (Cal. 1976).
36. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(c) (2010). The disclosure must be required by law, and limited
to the relevant legal requirements). Id. § 164.512(c)(i). Either the individual must agree to
the disclosure, or the covered entity must either believe the disclosure is needed to avert
serious harm (to the individual or other victims) or (if the individual is incapacitated and
cannot give consent) represent that the disclosed information will not be used against the
individual and that without disclosure immediate law enforcement activities will be adversely
affected. Id. § 164.512(c)(iii)(A)–(B).
37. Id. § 164.512(e). For disclosures not supported by a court order, the covered entity
must also receive “satisfactory assurance” that “reasonable efforts” have been made to give
notice to the individual. Id. at § 164.512(e)(ii)(A).
38. Id. § 164.524(a)(i).
39. PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY, supra note 27. The study also asks whether
third parties may have an interest in obtaining this information. Id.
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professionals in not having their notes open to review by their patients.40
The denial of a patient’s request for access to psychotherapy notes is not
subject to review.41
Another important justification for denial of a patient’s request to access
records is endangerment of the patient or others.42 The judgment of
endangerment is a professional judgment to be made by a licensed health
care professional. Access can also be denied if a record contains
information about someone else that might endanger them.43 An example
would be a medical record that contains judgments about the suspected
source of an infection, when this information would not otherwise be
available to the patient. Denials of access on grounds of endangerment are
reviewable.44
As mentioned above, HIPAA preempts contrary but not more stringent
state laws about privacy and security. The exact parameters of preemption
are explained in the regulations. State laws are “contrary” to HIPAA if
covered entities “would find it impossible” to comply with both the federal
and the state requirements.45 They are also “contrary” if the state law
“stands as an obstacle” to the achievement of the purposes of the statutory
requirement to protect privacy46 or to the purposes of the administrative
simplification provisions of the Social Security Act.47 State law provisions are
“more stringent” if they prohibit an otherwise permitted disclosure, unless
the disclosure is to HHS or to the individual.48 They are also “more
stringent” if they permit individuals greater rights to access or amend their
health information, or if they permit individuals to access more information
than permitted by the Privacy Rule.49 Thus states may expand the individual
right of access to health information, but may not contract it. States may

40. However, neither the American Psychiatric Association’s annotations to the Principles
of Medical Ethics nor ethics opinions treat confidentiality and disclosure of medical records to
patients. See, e.g., AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2010 ed. 2010),
available at http://www.psych.org/MainMenu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/ResourcesStandards/
Principles-of-Medical-Ethics-2010-Edition.aspx?FT=.pdf.
41. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(i) (2010).
42. Id. § 164.524(a)(3)(i).
43. Id. § 164.524(a)(3)(ii). This does not apply if the other person is a health care
professional.
44. Id. § 164.524(a)(3)-(4). Impartial review procedures are required.
45. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2010).
46. Id. § 160.202(2); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d–2
note).
47. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2010); Social Security Act, Title XI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301–
1320d-8 (2009).
48. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2010).
49. Id. § 160.202.
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therefore expand the individual right of access to psychotherapy notes
despite the exception in the Privacy Rule.50
II. HIPAA AND THE RIGHTS OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
In general, HIPAA treats personal representatives as individuals
themselves would be treated.51 This means that personal representatives
recognized under state law would have all the rights that individuals
themselves would have to access medical records. For adults and
emancipated minors, HIPAA simply defers to determinations of authority
under applicable law.52 For deceased individuals, HIPAA also defers to state
law governing the authority of personal representatives.53
For unemancipated minors, the interplay between HIPAA and state law
is more complex and more protective of the minor’s confidentiality. HIPAA
does not defer to state law determinations of authority to access records in
cases in which the minor’s consent to treatment is sufficient under state law,
the minor consents to the treatment, and the minor has not requested that
the person seeking access be treated as a personal representative.54 An
example would be state laws allowing minors to consent to treatment for
sexually transmitted diseases; in such cases, HIPAA would not defer to state
laws allowing access to parents unless the minor has requested that the
parent be treated as a personal representative. HIPAA also does not defer
to state law cases in which the unemancipated minor has the legal right to
obtain treatment without the consent of another, and has consented to the
treatment or the treatment has been authorized by law.55 Abortion is an
example; HIPAA would protect the record even if state law were to grant
parents the right of access. HIPAA also protects the record of an
unemancipated minor when the personal representative of the minor has
50. For a state explanation of this, see HIPAA Preemption Charts, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
HEALTH (last updated Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/hipaa/hipaa
_preemption_charts.htm.
51. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1) (2010).
52. Id. § 164.502(g)(2).
53. Id. § 164.502(g)(4). The American Psychiatric Association has noted that there may
be important differences between the ethical and legal rights of personal representatives to
access the records of decedents. See AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 24, 25 (2009), available at http://www.psych.org/Main
Menu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/ResourcesStandards/OpinionsofPrinciples.aspx. APA Ethics
Op. D.4.h responds to an inquiry from a treating psychiatrist of a patient who committed
suicide. The psychiatrist asks whether there is an obligation to release records to the
apparently abusing father who requested the records as executor of his son’s estate. The
opinion concludes that the father does not have an ethical right to the patient’s records,
although whether the father has a legal right is a different question. Id.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(A) (2010).
55. Id. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(B).
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assented to a confidentiality agreement with respect to the health care
service in question.56 When the parent of an unemancipated minor is not
the personal representative of the minor, and there is no applicable state or
other law concerning access, decisions about access by the parent should
be made according to professional judgment by a licensed health care
provider.57
In situations of possible abuse, neglect or endangerment, however,
HIPAA does not defer to state law concerning access of personal
representatives to records.58 The covered entity must have a “reasonable
belief” that the individual has been or may be the subject of domestic
violence or abuse or that regarding someone as the personal representative
would endanger the individual, and must exercise “professional judgment”
that access to the information is not in the best interest of the individual.59
III. RIGHTS TO ACCESS RECORDS UNDER STATE LAW
State laws vary widely in what they provide—or fail to provide—about
the rights of individuals or their personal representatives to access medical
records. States also vary in whether they provide any formal mechanisms for
individuals to use to restrict the rights of their personal representatives to
view some or all of their medical record. In addition, many state statutes in
this area are not, to say the least, models of clarity. The discussion that
follows is not intended as an exhaustive presentation of every state’s laws.
Rather, the goals of the discussion are to describe the remarkable variety
among state laws in this area and to call attention to significant gaps in
confidentiality protections when personal representatives have the right to
access medical records.

A. A Preliminary Note about Minors
Many states require special handling for the records of unemancipated
minors. Some states are highly protective of these minors’ rights to shield
their records from parents or others who may make decisions for them.
New York, for example, states that minors over the age of twelve may be
notified of a request for disclosure of medical records; if the minor objects to
the disclosure, the provider may deny the request.60 In New York, providers
also may refuse access by a parent or guardian on determining that the
information would have a detrimental effect on the provider’s professional

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(C).
Id. § 164.502(g)(3)(ii)(C).
Id. § 164.502(g)(5).
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(5) (2010).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 18(3)(c) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2010).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

382

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:371

relationship with the minor, the minor’s care, or the minor’s relationship with
parents or guardian.61
In addition, some states provide special protections for particular types
of information concerning minors. For example, in Michigan, minors age
fourteen or older may receive outpatient mental health services without the
consent or knowledge of their parents or guardians.62 When a minor
receives these services, the parent or guardian may not be informed without
the minor’s consent, unless the mental health professional determines there
is a compelling need for disclosure because of a substantial probability of
harm to the minor or to another.”63 In Illinois, a parent or guardian of a
child who is at least twelve but not yet eighteen may only inspect or copy
mental health records if the patient child is “informed and does not object
or if the therapist does not find that there are compelling reasons for
denying the access.”64 In New York, information concerning a minor’s
abortion or treatment for venereal disease may not be released to parents or
guardians.65
Because state laws about minors vary so greatly and introduce an
additional layer of complexity, this article focuses on access to medical
records concerning adults and emancipated minors. However, the need
under state law for special handling of records concerning sensitive
information about minors poses difficulties for the introduction of systems
allowing minors or their parents access to these records electronically.66
Addressing these issues for adults may provide methods that can be helpful
in the case of minors as well.

B.

Similar Treatment for Access Rights of Principals and Access Rights of
Personal Representatives

Some states have laws that give individuals or their personal
representatives rights to access medical records but are silent concerning
rights under guardianship or advance directive statutes. These states

61. Id. § 18(2)(c).
62. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1707(1) (2011).
63. Id. § 330.1707(1)-(2). These services may not include pregnancy termination or
psychotropic drugs. Services should promote the relationship to the parent or guardian and
not undermine the values instilled in this relationship. These services are also limited in time
or number of visits. Id. § 330.1707.
64. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/4(1), (3) (LexisNexis 2010). Interestingly, there is no similar
limit for the holder of a DPA for mental health treatment. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/4(7)
(West 2010).
65. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2010).
66. NCVHS Committee on Privacy, Confidentiality, and Security: AAP Response to
Committee Questions, NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/
100615p07.pdf (last visited June 16, 2011).
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apparently do not differentiate between the rights of individuals themselves
or the rights of their representatives. Kentucky is an example, requiring that
health care providers furnish a copy of a medical record upon the written
request of a patient, the patient’s attorney, or the patient’s authorized
representative.67 The Kentucky guardianship statute authorizes the guardian
to consent to medical care but makes no mention of medical records.68 The
advance directive statute likewise is silent about access to medical records
by an authorized surrogate decision maker.69 Several other states have
similar non-differentiating statutes.70 Vermont has statutes that are silent but
with the additional twist that individuals may use advance directives to
specify others in addition to their agents who may receive health records.71
Another variation is silence in some statutes but the right to differentiate in
others; in Utah, for example, there is no mention of medical information in
the guardianship statute72 but the advance directive statute allows the
principal to limit the agent’s right to receive medical information.73
Some state statutes specify that guardians or holders of the durable
power of attorney (DPA) have the same rights as individuals would have to
access their medical records. For example, Alabama law states that
“[r]equests for copies of any medical records must be accompanied by a
current valid duly executed authorization and release which has been signed
by the recipient or by one legally authorized to act on behalf of the
recipient.”74 The Alabama advance directive and default surrogate decision67. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.317(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
68. Id. § 387.660 (2010).
69. Id. § 311.629 (2007).
70. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4971 (2002 & Supp. 2010) (copies of health care records to
patient or patient’s authorized representative); id. § 59-3075(b)(5) (2005 & Supp. 2010)
(guardianship); id. § 58-629 (DPA for health care). Other states with non-differentiating
statutes include: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-46-106 (1999 & Supp. 2009) (patient or
attorney right to medical record; curiously, guardian omitted from first but not subsequent
sections of this code provision); id. § 28-65-301 (2004 & Supp. 2009) (duties of guardian);
id. § 20-13-104 (2005) (durable power of attorney for health care); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN.
§ 30-5-5-16(b) (West 2009) (designated health care agent); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.58.1 (2008) (DPA for health care; DPA statute for mental health is different); id. §
28:227(C) (2010); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1631(3) (West 1999 & Supp.
2011) (guardianship); id. § 33.26265(1) (West 2011) (access to medical records); id. §
700.5506(1) (decision-maker for health care); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 8:42-11.2(a)(5)
(West 2010) (access to medical records); id. § 26:2H-61(a), (e) (patient representative); id. §
26:2H-110 (mental health representative); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1241(3)
(2010) (guardianship).
71. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9419 (Supp. 2010) (access to medical records); id. tit. 14, §
3069 (guardianship statute); id. tit. 18, § 9702(a)(11) (advance directive statute).
72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-312(2)(c) (2011).
73. Id. § 75-2a-117(Part I)(E).
74. ALA. CODE § 22-5A-6(d) (2006).
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making laws are silent about access to medical records75 but the Alabama
DPA statute provides that the DPA “may, for the purpose of making a health
care decision, request, review, and receive any information, oral or written,
regarding the principal’s physical or mental health, including medical and
hospital records. . . .”76 In Illinois, the default surrogate decision maker
statute provides that the surrogate has the same powers as the principal with
respect to medical records77 and the DPA statute provides that the agent has
the same power as the principal “whether the records relate to mental health
or any other medical condition. . . .”78 The language in Georgia’s
recommended DPA form states explicitly that the health care agent “will
have the same access to [the principal’s] medical records . . . .”79 The
Maryland statute is to the same effect.80 Mississippi gives DPAs for health
care the authority to make any health care decisions the principal could
have made while having capacity,81 including the right to “request, receive,
examine, copy and consent to the disclosure of medical or any other health
care information.”82
Idaho law has even more sweeping provisions about access to medical
information by the holder of the DPA. The Idaho DPA form statute provides
explicitly that the DPA may “[r]equest, review and receive any information,
verbal or written, regarding [the patient’s] physical or mental health
including, but not limited to, medical and hospital records.”83 This form is a
“HIPAA Release Authority” that authorizes release of “all of [the principal’s]
individually identifiable health information and medical records regarding
any past, present or future medical or mental health condition” including
information regarding HIV status, sexually transmitted diseases, mental
illness, and alcohol or drug abuse.84 As this is a “HIPAA release,” it may be

75. Id. § 22-8A-11. The advance directive act does allow patients to limit the decisions
that a health care agent may make, however. Id. § 22-8A-6.
76. Id. § 26-1-2(4).
77. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/25(e) (LexisNexis 2010).
78. Id. § 45/4-10(c)(4) (effective July 1, 2011).
79. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4 (2009).
80. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603(Part I)(G)(2) (LexisNexis 2009).
81. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-205(2) (2010).
82. Id. § 41-41-217.
83. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510(5)(A) (Supp. 2010).
84. Id. § 39-4510(5)(B). This statute does not apparently recognize the possibility that
confidentiality protections under the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Act
(SAMHSA) may be more stringent than those under HIPAA. See CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE PATIENT RECORDS
REGULATION AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: IMPLICATIONS FOR ALCOHOL AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE
PROGRAMS (2004), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/HealthPrivacy/docs/SAMHSAPart2HIPAAComparison2004.pdf.
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meant to be limited to uses and disclosures that HIPAA recognizes with
authorization, but there is no explicit statement about whether the authority
would also include psychotherapy notes under mental illness records or
records of treatment for substance abuse that are protected under the
federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) regulations. HIPAA does not require authorization to permit the
personal representative to have whatever access to medical records is
permitted by state law, although it should be noted that this “HIPAA release”
would not meet HIPAA requirements for authorization of a use or disclosure
of psychotherapy notes.85 Importantly, the Idaho form also invites patients
to specify any limits on the availability of information, just as they might
specify limits on the treatment decisions that the DPA might make, although
this requires explicit “opt in” statement and thus may not be exercised by
many patients. The exact language of this invitation reads: “You can also
include a statement of your desires concerning other matters relating to your
health care, including a list of one or more persons whom you designate to
be able to receive medical information about you . . . .”86
Like Idaho, South Carolina includes a HIPAA authorization in the DPA
form.87 The form provides access to all medical records, including mental
health records, with no exception for psychotherapy notes. The actual
language of the authorization reads:
“all individually identifiable health information and medical records shall be
released without restriction to my health care agent(s) and/or my alternate
health care agent(s) named above including, but not limited to, (i)
diagnostic, treatment, other health care, and related insurance and financial
records and information associated with any past, present, or future physical
or mental health condition including, but not limited to, diagnosis or
treatment of HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted disease(s), mental illness, and/or
drug or alcohol abuse and (ii) any written opinion relating to my health that
such health care agent(s) and/or alternate health care agent(s) may have
requested.”88

The DPA form invites patients to include any limitations on choices about
care, but this invitation is silent about inclusion of limits on access to
information.

85. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3)(ii) (2010) (authorization for disclosure of psychotherapy
notes may only be combined with authorization for disclosure of other psychotherapy notes).
These regulations have specific requirements for consent to disclosure, but these do not
include the HIPAA requirement for separate authorization. Id. § 2.31.
86. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510(4) (Supp. 2010).
87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-504 (2009).
88. Id.
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C. Increased Access Rights for Principals Extended to Personal
Representatives?
HIPAA preemption allows states to implement more stringent privacy
protections than HIPAA requires. As described above, this includes giving
individuals more extensive rights to access their health information than
HIPAA requires. One potentially unnoticed consequence of this extension,
however, is that these same rights may be extended to personal
representatives. If individuals are given more rights than HIPAA, and their
personal representatives are given equivalent rights, the personal
representative would also have the extended rights.89 A few states have
statutes with explicit statements that give individuals rights to access their
health information that extend beyond their rights under HIPAA.
New York may be one example of this complex interplay. New York
grants patients more extensive rights than HIPAA and grants the rights of
patients to personal representatives, and provides special protection for
minors from access to their records. New York gives patients, their
surrogates, or their legally appointed guardians, the rights to request copies
of medical records and to obtain access to patient information.90 New York
also gives “qualified” persons rights of access to medical records, including
attorneys who hold powers of attorney authorizing access.91 The right
includes copies of “all x-rays, medical records and test records including . . .
original mammograms”92 This right also includes psychotherapy notes
insofar as they are not “personal notes of the said physician or hospital”93
and thus extends more broadly than HIPAA.94 Providers may also refuse
access that might “reasonably be expected to cause substantial and
identifiable harm” to the patient or another.95 New York’s statute granting
the authority to appoint an agent does not include this restriction, however.
This statute provides that health care agents appointed by competent adults
have the right to receive medical information and records “necessary to
make informed decisions regarding the principal’s health care”
89. The HIPAA provisions regarding rights of personal representatives as described above
do not require an authorization as between the individual and the personal representative. 45
C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2010).
90. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 17, 18 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2010).
91. Id. § 18(1)(g).
92. Id. § 17. Laboratory tests include, but are not limited to, tests administered in clinical
laboratories or blood banks. Id.
93. Id.
94. Although New York defines “personal notes and observations” as “a practitioner’s
speculations, impressions (other than tentative or actual diagnosis) and reminders,” this
definition cannot be construed to include information relied on for treatment, in which case
HIPAA would require disclosure. Id. § 18(1)(f).
95. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 18(3)(d).
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“[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary.”96 A similar right is given to
statutory surrogates for incompetent adult patients.97 An important limit in
these statutes, however, is that the right of access is to information needed
to make informed care decisions.
Massachusetts may be similar to New York. Massachusetts provides that
patients or their authorized representative are permitted to inspect health
records.98 At the discretion of the psychotherapist, this includes the entire
record unless it would adversely affect the patient’s well-being.99 In
Massachusetts, health care agents have the authority to make any decisions
that the principal can make.100 Health care directives also may include any
limitations that are to be placed upon the agent’s authority.101 Agents have
the right to receive “any and all medical information necessary to make
informed decisions regarding the principal’s health care, including any and
all confidential medical information that the principal would be entitled to
receive.”102 As in New York, the right of access is restricted to information
needed for health care decisions and this may be an important limit.
Oregon also extends the patient’s rights of access to health
information103 to include psychotherapy notes.104 Personal representatives
have the same rights as principles, unless these rights are limited by the
terms of appointment or by federal law.105 For holders of a DPA for mental
health treatment, the right to review records is limited to records related to
the treatment at issue.106
Except to the extent the right is limited by the appointment or any federal
law, a health care representative for an incapable principal has the same
right as the principal to receive information regarding the proposed health
care, to receive and review medical records and to consent to the disclosure
of medical records.107

Under a durable power of attorney for mental health, the attorney in fact
has the same right as the principal to review medical records, but only that
related to that treatment.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(3).

Id. § 2994-d(3)(c).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12CC (West Supp. 2003).

Id.
Id. ch. 201D, § 5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
Id. § 4(iii).
Id. § 5.
OR. REV. STAT. § 192.518 (2009).
OR. ADMIN. R. 847-012-0000(3)(b) (2011).
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.535 (2009 & Supp 2010).
Id. § 127.712.
Id. § 127.535(3).
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Texas may be another example of a state that gives patients more
extensive rights to disclosure of their medical records than does HIPAA, and
then extends those rights to personal representatives. Patients or their
personal representatives108 are entitled to access to medical information
unless the physician determines it will be harmful to their physical, mental,
or emotional health.109 Patients also are entitled to access the content of
confidential mental health records, unless the professional determines that
access to the record would be harmful to the patient’s physical, mental, or
emotional health.110 A guardian has the duty to provide the ward with
medical care and to consent to medical, psychiatric, and surgical
treatment.111 There is no statement in the Texas guardianship statute about
access to medical records or to mental health records specifically on the
part of the guardian.112 The Texas DPA statute is similarly silent regarding
access of the holder of a DPA to medical or to mental health records.113
Nebraska emphasizes the importance for patients to have access to their
medical records: “Patients need access to their own medical records as a
matter of fairness to enable them to make informed decisions about their
health care and correct inaccurate or incomplete information about
themselves.”114 There is an exception for mental health records if the
treating provider determines that authorization would not be in the best
interest of the patient.115 Nebraska makes no statement, however, that
rights to access mental health records exclude psychotherapy notes.
Nevada may also have extended rights of patients to access medical
records beyond HIPAA and, by implication, have extended the rights of
personal representatives as well. In Nevada, patients, or representatives
with written authorization from the patient, may inspect health care
records.116 DPAs are given the right “to request, review and receive any
information, verbal or written, regarding my physical or mental health,
including, without limitation, medical and hospital records . . . .”117

108. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 159.005 (Vernon 2004).
109. Id. § 159.006.
110. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 611.0045 (Vernon 2010).
111. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 767(a)(3)–(4) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2010).
112. See id. § 767(a) (guardian has a duty to provide ward with medical care).
113. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.152 (Vernon 2010) (describing the scope
and duration of DPA authority).
114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-8401 (2003).
115. Id. § 71-8403(1).
116. Id. § 629.061 (2010).
117. Id. § 162A.860.
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D. Restrictions on Access to Certain Types of Records
Some states have separate DPA statutes for mental health treatment.
These or other statutes may give special protection from disclosure for
mental health records. South Dakota is an example of a state with a
separate DPA for mental health with separate powers to receive information.
In South Dakota, patients or their designees have the right to request copies
of their medical records from licensed health care providers118 or from
health care facilities, with the exception of chemical dependency treatment
facilities.119 Patients have the right to execute a DPA to make health care
decisions on their behalf.120 Holders of a DPA and other persons authorized
to make health care decisions for others have the same rights as patients to
consent to disclosure of medical records.121 Providers and facilities are
insulated from liability for disclosures of medical records when, in good
faith, they believe that the request for the record is made by an individual
authorized to request it.122 South Dakota has additional provisions for
mental health records. Patients have the right to access their mental health
records.123 Patients also have the right to execute a power of attorney to
consent to mental illness treatment.124 In South Dakota, holders of a DPA for
mental health treatment have the same rights as those they represent to
receive or consent to disclosure of medical records relating to mental health
treatment, unless the patient’s declaration of the power limits that right.125
By contrast, South Dakota’s general DPA for health care does not contain
the same mention of the possibility that the declarant might wish to limit the
right to access treatment records. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, the mental
health DPA form invites specifications of limits on rights to receive
information,126 but the general DPA for health care statute does not.127 In
Louisiana, general DPA powers do not include provisions for restriction of
access to information128 but DPA powers for mental health treatment do.129

118. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-2-16 (2004).
119. Id. § 34-12-15.
120. Id. § 59-7-2.1 (2009).
121. Id. § 34-12C-6 (2004).
122. Id. § 59-7-8 (2009) (requests from attorneys-in-fact or agents); id. § 34-12C-7
(requests from any person believed to be authorized).
123. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-26.1 (2004). There are exceptions for information
provided by a third party under assurances of confidentiality accompanied with a
determination that access would be detrimental to the patient’s health. Id.
124. Id. § 27A-16-3.
125. Id. § 27A-16-7 (the statute also provides that the right may be limited by federal law).
126. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5833(b)(1), (c) (West 2005).
127. See id. § 5471.
128. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 (2008) (general DPA statute).
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In Colorado, access to mental health records by personal
representatives is limited. Although patient records are available to
personal representatives, mental health records or other records that would
have a significant negative psychological impact on the patient are excluded
from this requirement.130 In Iowa, mental health providers may disclose
information to the spouse, parent, adult child, or adult sibling of patients
with chronic mental illness when three factors are met, including direct
involvement in the patient’s care.131 Disclosures are limited to diagnosis and
prognosis, medications, and a description of the patient’s treatment plan.132
Georgia has an unusual example of limits on the right to receive mental
health records in the case of decedents. In Georgia, estate executors,
administrators, or spouses (in the absence of the appointment of an
executor or administrator) have the right to request records of decedents,133
but this right specifically excludes the right to receive records regarding
psychiatric, psychological, or other mental health treatment.134 West
Virginia also limits access to mental health information.135 Indiana similarly
limits access to mental health information, alcohol or drug abuse treatment
information, and information about communicable diseases.136
In Minnesota, personal representatives have the same right as the
principal to access medical records.137 However, the mental health
information that can be released to a spouse, parent, child, sibling of a
patient, or direct care giver is limited.138 Providers must ask patients if they
agree to the disclosure.139

E.

Recognizing Patient Preferences: Limiting Access to the “Need to Know”

Several states tie the personal representative’s access to health
information to the “need to know.” In Montana, providers may disclose
health information without a patient’s consent based on the recipient’s need
to know.140 This would limit disclosures to the information needed to make
the care decisions at hand. Patients also may instruct their providers not to

129. Id. § 28:227(C) (2009) (authorizing access to information regarding mental health
treatment and mental health records related to treatment).
130. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-801(1)(a) (2010).
131. IOWA CODE ANN. § 228.8(1) (West 2009).
132. Id. § 228.8(4).
133. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-33-2(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2009).
134. Id. § 31-33-4 (Supp. 2010).
135. W. VA. CODE § 16-29-1 (West 2011).
136. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-39-1-1, 16-39-1-3 (2008).
137. MINN. STAT. § 145B.08 (2010).
138. Id. § 144.294.
139. Id. § 144.294, Subd. 3(a)(5).
140. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-529 (2009).
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make such disclosures. In Florida, surrogates have the authority to make
health care decisions for patients during incapacity141 and the authority to
access appropriate medical records.142 “[H]ealth care decision” is defined
to include the right to access all of the principal’s records that are
reasonably necessary for the health care surrogate to make decisions
involving the health care of the principal.143
Limiting access to the need to know sets the default position so that
personal representatives will not automatically have access to the full
medical record. This may be the default position that best reflects the
preferences of most patients.
It gives personal representatives the
information that they need to make medical decisions. It does not give
personal representatives unlimited authority to see information in the record
outside of that needed for care. Although this approach may best reflect
what patients in general would want, it may not reflect the preferences of
some patients, who may want their personal representatives to have either
greater or lesser access to their records. Montana’s addition of the
possibility for patients to instruct their providers not to make disclosures
respects the choices of patients with these different preferences.

F.

Recognizing Patient Preferences: Inviting Patients to Limit the Power of
DPAs or Surrogates to Access Medical Records

Some states have DPA statutory provisions that the holder of the DPA
has the same rights as the patient to access health care information, unless
the advance directive specifies otherwise.144 These statutes are of the “opt
in” variety and require positive action on the part of the directive’s maker. If
patients are less likely to use “opt in” possibilities than their preferences
reflect, these options may be underutilized.145 These statutes do, however,
141. FLA. STAT. § 765.205(1)(a) (2010).
142. Id. § 765.205(1)(d).
143. Id. § 765.101(5)(c).
144. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.070(a) (2008); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4678 (West 2009);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2509(a) (2003 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE § 21-2206(a)(2) (2001
& Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-8 (2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.7 (West 2005);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-808 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 404.840 (2000); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-3417(4) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:9(II)(a) (2005 & Supp. 2010); N.M.
STAT. § 24-7A-8 (West 2010) (general DPA); id. § 24-7B-10 (mental health DPA); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 32A-25.1(a) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-08 (2002 & Supp. 2009); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(3) (West 2004); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5456(d) (West
2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1809 (2006); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.157 (Vernon 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.30 (West
2006 & Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-409 (2009).
145. For reasons to think that cognitive bias reduces the likelihood that people will use
“opt in” strategies, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83-87, 108-10 (2008).
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at least point out to people making advance directives the possibility that
they might want to limit access to their medical information.
In Utah the advance directive statute requires a “yes” or “no” choice by
the maker of the directive concerning whether the health care agent has the
power to access medical records. This power applies whether or not agents
can speak for themselves.146 Structuring the advance directive in this way
does not introduce the possibility of cognitive bias in an “opt in” or “opt
out” structure.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
State laws about the access of personal representatives to health records
vary widely. Some states simply assume that personal representatives have
the rights of principals; others state this explicitly. Some states expand the
right of individuals to access their medical records beyond disclosures
required under HIPAA, without apparently considering whether this
expanded access applies to personal representatives. Some states have
special limits for rights to access certain types of information, particularly
mental health information, substance abuse treatment information, or
information about contagious disease. Some states may reflect patient
preferences for limits by delineating access on a “need to know” basis,
unless patients have specified otherwise. Some states’ advance directive
statutes invite patients to set limits on access to medical information by their
decision makers on an “opt in” basis. One state’s form has a “yes” or “no”
choice for access to medical records for personal representatives.
From the point of view of respect for patient autonomy, this situation is
far from ideal. It is not surprising however as many advance directive
statutes were drafted before the quite recent groundswell in support of
interoperable electronic health records. In light of this situation, this article
makes four recommendations.
First, advance directive statutes should explicitly ask patients to
designate the extent to which their personal representatives should have
access to interoperable medical records. Ideally, the suggested advance
directive form would identify specific types of information that patients may
or may not want their personal representatives to see: information about
mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, or reproductive history,
for example. The form should include options for “all” information, for
information only on a “need to know” basis, or for no information.
Structured this way, statutes would bring the issue to patients’ attention. It
will require them to make a choice and thus avoid the potential for cognitive
bias introduced by “opt in” or “opt out” mechanisms. A form structured with

146. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-117(2)(Part I (E)) (Supp. 2010).
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specific choices prompts patients to decide what types of information they
would—or would not—want to have shared with their personal
representatives.
In many circumstances, patients will not have exercised such choices.
This occurs when personal representatives have been designated for
individuals, rather than being chosen through the patient’s advance
directive. It will also happen when patients have designated their decisionmaker but without specifying authority to access information in their medical
records. This last situation arguably is the circumstance with most advance
directives today: patients are invited to specify the care they would (or would
not) wish to receive, and to designate their decision-maker for health care.
They are not, however, reminded that their decision-maker is also most
likely being given authority to access their medical records or confronted
with a choice in this regard.
A second recommendation is, therefore, that in these circumstances of
absence of choice, the default position should be that personal
representatives’ access to medical information should take place on a “need
to know” basis. That is, personal representatives should have access to
information in the record that is needed to make care decisions, rather than
access to the entire record. Limiting access in this way is most likely to
reflect what patients would want. The purpose of a personal representative
for health care decisions is, after all, to make health care decisions. These
decisions should be informed on a need to know basis. It is unlikely that
patients understand the design of interoperable records, and it is likely that
patients would be surprised to find the scope of the information that may
ultimately be accessible through these vehicles. Setting the default position
as “need to know” would thus avoid the surprise of many Mothers about
their Daughters’ access to their medical records.
At present, interoperable medical records are not designed to allow
special management of types of information that patients may regard as
sensitive. There is discussion on the federal level of encouraging the
development of capacities for interoperable health records to incorporate
information management structures that will better reflect patient preferences
for the management of designated categories of sensitive health
information.147 These categories may include psychotherapy notes and
mental health treatment information, substance abuse treatment
information, genetic information, information about treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases, and reproductive information. The access of personal
147. See, e.g., Letter from Justine M. Carr, Chairperson, Nat’l Comm. of Vital Health &
Statistics, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Recommendations Regarding Sensitive Health Information (Nov. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/101110lt.pdf.
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representatives to health records is an additional reason for encouraging
this development. A third recommendation is that as capacities for separate
management of designated categories of sensitive information become
available, advance directives should be structured to take advantage of
these developments.
Finally, these recommendations should apply both to patients with
mental illness and to patients with cognitive disabilities. Despite the
recognition that some patients have dual diagnoses of both mental illness
and cognitive disabilities, access to the medical records of these groups of
patients might seem to raise different issues, a possibility that warrants
further discussion.
Patients with personal representatives because of mental illness will have
at least some mental health treatment records. As described above, there is
significant confusion and variation in state laws concerning the rights of
both patients and their representatives to mental health treatment records.
Under HIPAA, and in most states, neither patients nor their representatives
have access to psychotherapy notes. From the perspective of patient
autonomy, this limit is difficult to justify. Leaving aside this more general
concern, an additional problem from the perspective of autonomy is that
some state statutes may allow personal representatives the ability to access
mental health records that patients themselves could not. If patient
autonomy is to be given priority, however, patients’ choices about whether
their representatives should be able to see these records should be honored,
just as patients’ choices should be honored about other types of records.
Personal representatives may object that they need access to these records
to make treatment decisions. In cases in which individuals have not made
provisions about their personal representatives’ access to records, mental
health records would, like other records, be available on a need to know
basis. If individuals have specified that they do not want their representative
to see mental health records, however, autonomy requires respecting this
restriction—just as it does for other patients who choose to limit their
representatives’ access to their information.
For patients with cognitive disabilities, especially if these disabilities are
longstanding, prior preferences may be difficult to ascertain. As explained
above, in these cases records should be available on a need to know basis.
Personal representatives may argue that the need for protection warrants
access to certain types of records that patients may consider sensitive,
especially records about sexual history where there is a risk of exploitation.
On the default “need to know” approach, these records would be available
if they are relevant to current decisions about protecting the patient. The
only cases in which they would not be available would be cases in which the
patient has specified in advance either that the representative should not
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have access to any records, or that the representative should not have
access to records in a designated category.
These four recommendations are autonomy-centric. They give patients
the right to specify in advance whether their representatives should be able
to access medical records. Where patients have not specified, they urge
access on a “need to know” basis, so that representatives will have the
information that is relevant to making health care decisions. They are
designed to allow those patients who wish control to exercise it. They are
also designed to respect what is likely to be the assumption of most patients:
that they would be surprised to discover that the current power and promise
of interoperable medical records is not only to improve care, but also to
open everything to view.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

396

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:371

